Medicine is a risky business and anaesthetists are familiar with having to make difficult decisions when complex clinical emergencies arise. There are perhaps few more challenging anaesthetic situations than failed tracheal intubation and when this arises in the obstetric setting, the burden on the anaesthetist and the consequences of his/her actions may be considerable [2, 3] . The marked decline in general anaesthesia for caesarean section in many parts of the world in recent decades has reduced the likelihood of anaesthetists' encountering such a situation, but increased the pressure on them when they do: not only is caesarean section under general anaesthesia a relatively rare event for many anaesthetists, it tends to be reserved for women requiring the most urgent delivery [4, 5] . Conditions at these times are often adverse, the time pressure extreme and the 'stakes' may reasonably be described as high.
Algorithms to guide anaesthetists who encounter this emergency have been described [6, 7] , but despite publication of a universal difficult airway guideline for non-obstetric, non-paediatric patients in 2004 [8] , it is only now that national obstetric-specific difficult airway guidelines have been developed in the UK. These guidelines, jointly developed by the Obstetric Anaesthetists' Association (OAA) and Difficult Airway Society, are published in this edition of Anaesthesia [9] , and we commend the authors for their careful and thorough work. We are certain that these guidelines will be a major tool for improving safety in obstetric anaesthesia.
It is no surprise that obstetricspecific difficult airway guidelines have been long in the making, given the myriad of settings in which the airway crisis may occur and the limited available evidence base [10] . These new guidelines aim to provide a consistent framework for providing safe obstetric general anaesthesia and the management of unanticipated difficult tracheal intubation, failed tracheal intubation and the dreaded 'can't intubate, can't oxygenate' (CICO). Discussion of management after failed intubation covers the different actions to be taken should the anaesthetist decide to wake the patient or proceed with general anaesthesia. The difficulty in making this decision is acknowledged by including criteria that aim to aid selection of the most appropriate option in the light of the differing circumstances of each particular case.
The guidelines' authors emphasise the value of greater simplicity in decision-making and the importance and influence of human factors, something lacking from many previous guidelines but increasingly recognised as crucially important, especially in a clinical crisis that may be unstable, complex and time-critical [11] [12] [13] . One aspect of this is how decisions are made, and despite the most prescriptive clinical guidelines, decision-making -or more specifically, making 'correct' decisions -is likely to pay a big part in influencing outcome. Here, we focus on some of the factors involved in this process, basing our discussion around points raised (and comments made by respondents) in a survey we conducted in 2012 [1] in which we presented UK OAA members with a hypothetical case, summarised in Box 1, and asked how they would proceed (and why), using an inductive approach to data analysis [14] .
"We do need to recognise that these decisions are complex, made in the moment, and informed by very particular sets of circumstances" -Survey respondent [1] Making decisions -defined as 'choices among alternatives' -is an essential human behaviour that has been extensively studied in cognitive psychology but less so in the medical specialties [15] . It is not uncommon (e.g. in conversations in the workplace, presentations at meetings, and case reports published in the literature) to discuss clinical management of challenging cases (such as that in Box 1) in terms of what was done, rather than why the decisions were made that led to the actions taken. In our view, failure to explore the reasoning behind the decision-making and to discuss alternatives, and the circumstances under which they might be better, or worse, represents a failure of debriefing, from both a risk-management and an educational point of view. In such discussions, one also must recognise that there are many factors that may lead clinicians not to make consistent choices when faced with the same or similar critical event, and these too should be explored.
"We are always wiser in hindsight" -Survey respondent [1] Whether analysing an actual case or a survey/scenario, it is tempting to compare the decisions made with the 'model' solution, to attempt to determine whether the clinicians or a group of respondents made the 'correct' decision. One way of doing this might be to compare the actual decisions against published guidelines -something that is often done (in excruciating detail) in the Courts. However, such 'cold' analysis can easily overlook the human factors already mentioned, and makes the assumption that the guidelines are themselves logical and based on evidence -let alone the risk that a number of guidelines may conflict regarding 'best' management [16] . Similarly, the views of 'experts' may be diametrically opposed to one another [17] . Techniques that aim to apply a more logical analysis of treatment options have been described but they may suffer from a lack of evidence to inform both the likelihood of certain outcomes in such specific situations and the degree of 'preference' for one outcome over another [18] . Thus there are many unknowns: whether the airway will deteriorate during the case; whether the fetus's condition will worsen if the mother is woken; whether the mother would be best left supine with lateral tilt or turned fully lateral; whether ventilation should remain spontaneous or positive pressure ventilation applied, and whether neuromuscular blocking drugs should be given; whether a tracheal tube should be passed through the laryngeal mask (and if so, how), or whether that would risk making things worse. These considerations do not even take account of the vast array of airway equipment we may, or may not, have at our disposal [19] .
"This case raises lots of ifs, buts and maybes, which would alter the decision process"
The case presented in Box 1 excludes the subtleties that influence 'real-life' decision-making, and perhaps that is why such a disparity of results were obtained. Missing data that might be gathered as part of the general situational awareness of the anaesthetist actually present would include: the mother's past history; her social setup; the equipment available and the anaesthetist's expertise using it; the skill and expertise of the surgeon(s), anaesthetic assistant and other staff; and the 'feel' of the airway during ventilation and whether it felt stable and the oxygen saturations were well maintained. Thus an experienced anaesthetist, used to managing difficult cases without tracheal intubation, with an experienced assistant who is confident at being able to maintain cricoid pressure, and an experienced and fast surgeon for a small baby with no other complicating factors, would be expected to decide differently from an inexperienced anaesthetist under the opposite circumstances. Experienced anaesthetists may even do one thing but advise another -this dichotomous behaviour was described by 2% of the anaesthetists who said they would continue anaesthesia; thus: "I am experienced and would continue to save the fetus. I would advise a junior trainee always to wake the mother up and call for help". It is difficult to legislate for such complexity in any set of guidelines.
"I will call for help but foremost I must be confident in myself and keep calm"
So far we have considered mainly external factors (the circumstances of the case) but it is also important to realise that there are internal factors -and not just those relating to experience -also at play. These include the practitioner's underlying attitudes to risk and a host of cognitive biases that may hinder the application of his/her knowledge and skills and potentially compromise effective decision-making, as well as his/her current emotional state and ability to cope under stress [20] . Cognitive errors are less obvious than procedural errors and do not solely afflict the inexperienced. In the situation presented, an overriding fear of a dead baby or mother ("The decision would haunt me, but I believe it is the right one"), and a fear of criticism by colleagues and of breaching presumed medicolegal standards ("The decision to carry on in these circumstances would be difficult to defend"), may play heavily on some anaesthetists' minds.
"I would like to think I would behave as I have indicated but in real life I may not"
Surveys of practice may suggest how respondents might behave but do not represent the real thing and cannot provide all the subtle factors that influence decision-making. When it comes to what anaesthetists actually do do when confronted with a similar situation to the one we presented, there is a distinct lack of detailed evidence. A recent, two-year, UK casecontrol study of failed obstetric intubation provides some clues [21] . The study focused more on risk factors and outcomes, and less on decisionmaking, but of 52 failed intubations at caesarean section, at least 30 cases proceeded under general anaesthesia with a supraglottic airway (A. Quinn, personal communication). Interestingly, of the four women who were woken, two were reported to be 'urgency grade 1' and of those women who were not woken, eight were for non-urgent indications. The authors remark: "it is noteworthy that the clinicians chose to continue and not awaken the patients as per conventional teaching", although no reference or detail of this teaching is provided. Whatever conventional teaching advises -and we are not certain exactly what that is -this is clearly a controversial and debatable area and has been so for over 20 years [22, 23] .
It might appear that a significant majority of anaesthetists, at least those captured by Quinn et al.'s study, choose to continue anaesthesia rather than wake the patient when obstetric intubation fails in real-life. However, in the absence of specific details of the cases and accounts of why they decided to do what they did, little more can be concluded. Importantly, we cannot conclude that continuing anaesthesia is the correct decision, only this was what was done more frequently. Such data are nonetheless important, since they provide valuable information on rare outcomes, although we need to consider also how to gather data on the behavioural aspects of decision-making from real-life events, difficult though that is.
"While we all agree that our priority is to the mother, it is extremely difficult to let a baby potentially die" -Survey respondent [1] Of the anaesthetists who indicated they would wake the mother, the most often quoted reasons for doing so were the risks posed to her by an inadequate and unprotected airway (73%), and the primary duty of care to the mother (40%). Conversely, the commonest reasons quoted by those indicating they would continue were the risk to the fetus if delivery was delayed (64%) against a feeling that the airway, while not ideal, was adequate for the task at hand (75%). This illustrates how, when presented with the same information, people view and interpret it differentlythough in real-life there would be more clues regarding adequacy of the airway and ventilation. These findings also demonstrate how people attach different priorities to the mother ("My obligation is to put the mother's life as a priority over fetal demise") and the fetus ("There is an obvious fetal distress and the baby needs to be born").
People (including anaesthetists) have different attitudes to risk [24] , and the 'glass half-full/half-empty' views of the airway in our survey may illustrate this. Furthermore, those who said they would wake the mother were more likely to mention medicolegal factors or the possibility of facing criticism for risk-taking (see above), and 'teaching' or local policy that directed a specific action in this situation ("Current guidelines used in my place of work are to wake the patient up unless the mother's life is in immediate danger"). Accommodating clinicians' incongruent beliefs and risk perception within guidelines is difficult, but recognising that they exist is nonetheless important.
"Guidelines are to guide. Clinical judgments are made according to experience and may well not fit a guideline in these situations" -Survey respondent [1] Decision-making in this and other critical situations is complex, influenced by external and internal factors and compounded by ethical and medicolegal uncertainties and a limited evidence base -accounting for these variables in guidelines is difficult. However, good decision-making can enhance guidelines and we believe that people can learn how to make better decisions, but this demands attention on several fronts. The individual needs to understand the complexity of decision-making and his/her personal perception (and misperception) of risk that may lead to poor judgments. The trainer needs to recognise and utilise opportunities in the workplace to explore the reasons why decisions were made during the management of challenging clinical cases -trainees should be reassured that reflection, even when things don't turn out so well, can be a positive experience [11] . Finally, the research community that already recognises the important contribution of human factors, and the value of qualitative data collection in this area, should be commended and encouraged to continue and develop their good work.
It is reassuring that the authors of the new obstetric difficult airway guidelines emphasise the contribution of non-technical factors and the importance of decision-making in this setting [9] . We hope that greater focus on this interesting area can improve outcomes and lighten the load on anaesthetists managing these challenging and unpredictable cases.
"The surgeon will already have started the operation, in my experience"
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